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for the use and benefit of the John Hancock Trust and the 
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended 
("ERISA"), employee benefit plans that held, or continue to 
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and Participants and beneficiaries of all such ERISA covered 
employee benefit plans; and DANIELLE SANTOMENNO 
individually and on behalf of any person or entity that is a 
party to, or has acquired rights under, an individual or group 
variable annuity contract that was issued/sold by John 
Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.) where the 
underlying investment was a John Hancock proprietary fund 
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Danielle Santomenno, Karen Poley, and Barbara Poley 
(collectively, ―Participants‖) brought suit against John 
Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A.) and its affiliates 
(collectively, ―John Hancock‖) under the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 et seq., and the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(ICA), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq., for allegedly charging their 
retirement plans excessive fees on annuity insurance contracts 
offered to plan participants.  The District Court granted John 
Hancock‘s motion to dismiss.  It dismissed the ICA excessive 
fee claims because only those maintaining an ownership 
interest in the funds in question could sue under the derivative 
suit provision enacted by Congress and the Participants are no 
longer investors in the funds in question.  As to the ERISA 
claims, the District Court found that dismissal was warranted 
because Participants failed to make a pre-suit demand upon 
the plan trustees to take appropriate action and failed to join 
the trustees as parties.  We affirm the District Court‘s 
judgment with regards to the ICA claims, but vacate and 




This action arises out of the administration of 
employer-sponsored 401(k) benefit plans.  The trustees of 
these plans entered into group annuity contracts with John 
Hancock.  Participants brought this action on March 31, 2010.  
The basis of Participants‘ complaint is that John Hancock 
charged a variety of excessive fees in providing investment 
services to these plans.  Santomenno was a security holder in 
the relevant funds from July 2008 through sometime in June 
2010, K. Poley from July 2004 to sometime in January 2010, 
and B. Poley from January 2009 to sometime in January 
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2010.  Counts I through VII were brought under Section 
502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  Count VIII was 
brought under Section 36(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(b), and Count IX was brought under Section 47(b) of the 
ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b). 
 
 John Hancock moved to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6).  Drawing upon the common law of trusts, the 
District Court found that all of Participants‘ theories of 
liability under ERISA were derivative and dismissed all seven 
ERISA counts because Participants did not first make demand 
upon the trustees of the plan and did not join the trustees in 
the lawsuit.  As the District Court explained: 
 
In short, absent demand, or 
allegations going to demand 
futility, or some allegations, 
which if proven, would establish 
that the trustees improperly 
refused to bring suit, it would 
appear that the beneficiaries of an 
ERISA plan cannot bring a claim 
under Section 502.  Likewise, any 
such suit must join the plan's 
trustees.  Here, because there are 
no such factual allegations and 
because the trustees have not been 
joined, dismissal of the ERISA 
counts, counts I through VII, 
would seem to be proper. 
 
Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life 
Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), No. 2-10-cv-01655, 2011 WL 2038769, at 
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*4 (D.N.J. May 23, 2011) (citing McMahon v. McDowell, 794 
F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986)).  
 
The District Court dismissed Count VIII, brought 
under section 36(b) of the ICA, because Participants no 
longer owned any interest in John Hancock funds.  The 
District Court observed that ―continuous ownership 
throughout the pendency of the litigation [is] an element of 
statutory standing.‖  Id. at *5 (citing Siemers v. Wells Fargo 
& Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2007 WL 760750, *20 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 9, 2007)).  The District Court proceeded to dismiss 
Count IX because, in its view, Section 47(b) of the ICA could 
only provide relief to Participants if they could ―show[] a 
violation of some other section of the Act.‖  Id. (quoting 
Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 429, 
438 (D. Conn. 1983)).  Because Participants‘ Section 36(b) 
claim had been dismissed in Count VIII, the District Court 





The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Section 502(e) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), 
and Section 44 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. §80a-43.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
an order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary.  Anspach ex 
rel. Anspach v. City of Phila., Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 
256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007).  When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 
in the complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to 






We begin by addressing the ICA issues.  The first 
question is whether continuous ownership of securities in the 
fund in question during the pendency of litigation is required 
for actions brought under Section 36(b) of the ICA.  Section 
36(b), in pertinent part, provides: 
 
For the purposes of this 
subsection, the investment adviser 
of a registered investment 
company shall be deemed to have 
a fiduciary duty with respect to 
the receipt of compensation for 
services, or of payments of a 
material nature, paid by such 
registered investment company, or 
by the security holders thereof, to 
such investment adviser or any 
affiliated person of such 
investment adviser.  An action 
may be brought under this 
subsection by the Commission, or 
by a security holder of such 
registered investment company on 
behalf of such company, against 
such investment adviser, or any 
affiliated person of such 
investment adviser, or any other 
person enumerated in subsection 
(a) of this section who has a 
fiduciary duty concerning such 
compensation or payments, for 
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breach of fiduciary duty in respect 
of such compensation or 
payments paid by such registered 
investment company or by the 
security holders thereof to such 
investment adviser or person. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).  A suit brought under Section 36(b) is 
similar to a derivative action in that it is brought on behalf of 
the investment company.  Because the action is brought on 
behalf of the company, ―any recovery obtained in a § 36(b) 
action will go to the company rather than the plaintiff.‖  Daily 
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535 n.11 (1984) 
(citations omitted).  Accordingly, ―[i]n this respect, a § 36(b) 
action is undeniably ‗derivative‘ in the broad sense of that 
word.‖  Id. (citations omitted).   
 
 In the context of derivative suits governed by FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23.1, courts have imposed a requirement of 
continuous ownership.
1
  This requirement: 
                                              
1
 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) provides:  
 
This rule applies when one or 
more shareholders or members of 
a corporation or an 
unincorporated association bring a 
derivative action to enforce a right 
that the corporation or association 
may properly assert but has failed 
to enforce. The derivative action 
may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not 
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[D]erives from the first sentence 
of Rule 23.1, which refers to 
actions ‗brought by one or more 
shareholders to enforce a right of 
a corporation. . . .‘  The rule's 
provision that a ‗derivative action 
may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not 
fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the shareholders . . . 
similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation . . . ,‘ has 
served as an anchor for the 
concept that ownership must 
extend throughout the life of the 
litigation. 
  
Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(citations omitted). 
 
 Section 36(b) plainly requires that a party claiming a 
breach of the fiduciary duty imposed by that legislative 
provision be a security holder of the investment company at 
the time the action is initiated.  See, e.g., Dandorph v. 
Fahnestock & Co., 462 F. Supp.  961, 965 (D. Conn. 1979).  
Imposing a continuous ownership requirement throughout the 
pendency of the litigation assures that the plaintiff will 
                                                                                                     
fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of shareholders or 
members who are similarly 
situated in enforcing the right of 
the corporation or association. 
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adequately represent the interests of the security holders in 
obtaining a recovery for the benefit of the company.  
 
Participants assert that ―there is no basis upon which to 
impose a continuing ownership requirement on an ICA § 
36(b) claim.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. at 33.) (citations omitted).  
Several arguments are advanced in support of Participants‘ 
position.  First, citing two District Court decisions – In re 
American Mutual Funds Fee Litigation, cv-04-05593, 2009 
WL 8099820, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2009), and In re 
Mutual Funds Investment Litigation, 519 F. Supp. 2d 580, 
590 (D. Md. 2007) –  Participants contend that FED. R. CIV. P. 
23.1 does not apply to suits brought under Section 36(b).  
Participants also attempt to distinguish Siemers, 2007 WL 
760750, at *20, the primary case relied upon by the District 
Court in dismissing the ICA section 36(b) claim.  Participants 
assert that ―[Siemers] is distinguishable because [that] 
plaintiff did not have an interest in the investment fund when 
he filed his complaint.  Here, Plaintiff Danielle Santomenno 
did, but the Poleys did not.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. at 35.)  
Participants further offer a policy argument: ―the imposition 
of a continuous-ownership requirement would effectively 
deter a plaintiff, who wishes to mitigate damages by selling 
his or her investment, from suing – a result at odds with the 
salutary goals of the ICA.‖ (Appellant‘s Br. at 35.)   
 
We disagree with Participants‘ contentions.  First, we 
note that In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation, one of 
two cases relied upon by Participants, did not concern the 
continuous ownership question.  Instead, the District Court in 
that case addressed the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement rather than the continuous ownership 
requirement – the idea ―that, at the time of the alleged harm, 
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plaintiffs must have owned shares in the fund.‖ 519 F. Supp. 
2d at 590 (emphasis added).  There was no question in that 
case that the plaintiffs continued to hold shares in one of the 
mutual funds in question.
2
    
 
This leaves Participants with In re American Mutual 
Funds Fee Litigation, an opinion that goes against the weight 
of authority on this topic,
3
 and is premised upon an overly 
                                              
 
2
 Notably, the District Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
did not have standing to assert claims under Section 36(b) on 
behalf of mutual funds in the same family of funds, i.e., funds 
sharing a common investment advisor, because Section 36(b) 
mandates that the plaintiff ―be a ‗security holder of‘ the entity 
on whose behalf he seeks to bring suit.‖  519 F. Supp. 2d at 
589.  Thus, to this extent, the District Court acknowledged the 
derivative nature of a Section 36(b) claim.  See also Kauffman 
v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1970)  (a 
shareholder of mutual funds who sues on behalf of those 
funds cannot sue derivatively on behalf of other similarly 
situated mutual funds because ―[s]tanding is justified only by 
this proprietary interest created by the stockholder 
relationship and the possible indirect benefits the nominal 
plaintiff may acquire qua stockholder of the corporation 




  See, e.g., Siemers, 2007 WL 760750, at *20 (―For 
Section 36(b) standing purposes, it is important that the fund 
be continuously owned during the pendency of the action.‖); 
In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Litig., 407 F. Supp. 2d 616, 633 
(D.N.J. 2005) (plaintiffs cannot bring a Section 36(b) claim 
―on behalf of Funds in which they have no ownership 
interest‖ because such a claim is derivative, i.e., brought on 
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expansive reading of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Daily 
Income Fund.  The District Court in In re American Mutual 
Funds Fee Litigation viewed Daily Income Fund as 
dispensing with a continuous ownership standing requirement  
because such a requirement was recognized in the context of 
cases arising under FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1, and that rule does 
not apply to Section 36(b) claims.  Id. at *1.  Daily Income 
Fund, however, addressed only the pre-suit demand 
requirement of a common derivative action to which Rule 
23.1 applies, i.e., that before bringing suit a shareholder must 
make demand upon the corporation‘s directors to take 
appropriate action with respect to a right ―the corporation 
could itself have enforced in court.‖  464 U.S. at 529 
(citations omitted).  Because the right created by Section 
36(b) could not be read as one belonging to the company 
itself, the Court held that there was no basis for imposing a 
pre-suit demand requirement.  Id. at 542.  Daily Income Fund 
did not address the question of whether a securities holder 
must maintain that status throughout the pendency of the 
litigation.      
 
Participants mistakenly assume that the root of the 
continuous ownership requirement is Rule 23.1.  Instead, the 
prerequisite arises from the fact that Congress directed that 
                                                                                                     
behalf of the Funds), partially vacated on other grounds, 463 
F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2006); Brever v. Federated Equity 
Mgmt. Co. of Pa., 233 F.R.D. 429, 431 (W.D. Pa. 2005) 
(plaintiff who sold his shares after filing suit ―divested 
himself of standing‖ to bring suit under Section 36(b)); In re 
Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 451,468 n.13 
(D.N.J. 2005) (plaintiffs may only bring a Section 36(b) claim 
―against the . . . funds they owned‖).  
13 
 
only the Securities and Exchange Commission and securities 
holders, acting on behalf of the investment company, could 
bring an action to enforce the rights created by Section 36(b).  
As the Court recognized in Daily Income Fund, any recovery 
in an action brought under Section 36(b) belongs to the 
investment company.  464 U.S. at 535 n.11.  When a plaintiff 
disposes of his or her holdings in the company, that plaintiff 
no longer has a stake in the outcome of the litigation because 
any recovery would inure to the benefit of existing securities 
holders, not former ones.  A continuous ownership 
requirement gives effect to this ―undeniably ‗derivative‘‖ 
nature of a Section 36(b) claim.  Id.  Stated otherwise, a 
continuous ownership requirement ―reflects a shareholder's 
real interest in obtaining a recovery for the corporation which 
increases the value of his holdings.‖  Chiles, 719 F.2d at 1047 
(citing Lewis v. Knutson, 669 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1002 (5th Cir. 1978)).  As 
Participants no longer own John Hancock funds, they lack 
any real interest in securing a recovery.  
 
Participants‘ policy argument – that a continuous 
ownership requirement deters a plaintiff from mitigating 
damages by preventing him or her from selling shares during 
the pendency of litigation – is unconvincing.  First, because 
the recovery belongs to the company, not the security holder, 
see Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 535 n.11, it would not 
seem appropriate to impose a duty to mitigate damages on 
individual security holders.  Moreover, it has long been 
recognized that only those parties who would actually benefit 
from a suit may continue to prosecute the action, a rationale 




Standing is justified only by this 
proprietary interest created by the 
stockholder relationship and the 
possible indirect benefits the 
nominal plaintiff may acquire qua 
stockholder of the corporation 
which is the real party in interest.  
Without this relationship, there 
can be no standing, ―no right in 
himself to prosecute this suit.‖ 
 
434 F.2d at 735-36 (citations omitted).   
 
  Furthermore, we note that even if continuous 
ownership were not a requirement of Section 36(b), 
Participants‘ claim under that Section still fails.  As observed 
above, a plain reading of Section 36(b) indicates that 
ownership when the suit is first filed is an indisputable 
prerequisite.  The Poleys‘ interests in the John Hancock funds 
were terminated prior to the filing of the original complaint.  
Therefore, they cannot be classified as ―security holder[s]‖ 
under Section 36(b).  Santomenno, meanwhile, still owned 
John Hancock funds when the case was first initiated, but no 
longer had any interest in the funds when the Second 
Amendment Complaint was filed on October 22, 2010.  It is 
the Second Amended Complaint that is the operative pleading 
for standing purposes.  As the Supreme Court observed in 
Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 
(2007):  
 
The state of things and the 
originally alleged state of things 
are not synonymous; 
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demonstration that the original 
allegations were false will defeat 
jurisdiction.  So also will the 
withdrawal of those allegations, 
unless they are replaced by others 
that establish jurisdiction.  Thus, 
when a plaintiff files a complaint 
in federal court and then 
voluntarily amends the complaint, 
courts look to the amended 
complaint to determine 
jurisdiction.  
 
Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).  Even if we were to hold that 
continuous ownership is not required by the statute, 
Participants‘ Section 36(b) claim would fail because their 
interests in the John Hancock funds were terminated prior to 
the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.  As a result, 
they are not security holders entitled to bring an action on 
behalf of the investment company.  Accordingly, dismissal of 




The second ICA issue is whether Participants‘ claim 
under Section 47(b) of the ICA survives a motion to dismiss.  
Section 47(b), in pertinent part, provides that: 
 
A contract that is made, or whose 
performance involves, a violation 
of [the ICA], or of any rule, 
regulation, or order thereunder, is 
unenforceable by either party . . . 
16 
 
unless a court finds that under the 
circumstances enforcement would 
produce a more equitable result 
than nonenforcement and would 
not be inconsistent with the 
purposes of [the ICA].  
 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1). 
 
 Participants argue that the District Court incorrectly 
dismissed their Section 47(b) claim by erroneously believing 
it was premised upon a breach of the fiduciary duty provision 
of Section 36(b) of the ICA.  Participants assert that the 
Section 47(b) claim is not based upon a violation of  Section 
36(b), but is instead premised upon an alleged violation of 
Section 26(f) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(f), which 
requires that ―the fees and charges deducted under [a 
registered separate account funding variable insurance 
contract], in the aggregate, are reasonable in relation to the 
services rendered, the expenses expected to be incurred, and 
the risks assumed by the insurance company.‖  15 U.S.C. § 
80a-26(f)(2)(A).  While conceding that Section 26(f) does not 
establish a private cause of action, Participants contend that 
―its standards are enforceable in an action brought under ICA 
§ 47(b).‖  (Appellant‘s Br. at 38.)   
 
Participants contend that because amendments made in 
1980 to Section 47(b) ―substantially tracked‖ Section 215 of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
15, which had been ―previously construed by the Supreme 
Court [in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)] to provide a right of action,‖ Section 
47(b) similarly creates a private right of action in their favor 
17 
 
to seek rescission and restitution.  (Appellant‘s Reply Br. at 
24.)  Citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), 
Participants contend that the District Court should have read 
Section 47(b) of the ICA as the Supreme Court read Section 
215 of the IAA – as creating a private right of action: ―the 
Court‘s reasoning . . . that similarly-worded statutes should be 
similarly construed, especially when the statute at issue was 
enacted after a provision is judicially construed, supports 
Plaintiffs‘ position here.‖  (Appellant‘s Reply Br. at 24-25.)   
 
 Participants misread Sandoval, which made it clear 
that only Congress could create private rights of action.  532 
U.S. at 286 (―Like substantive federal law itself, private rights 
of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.‖).  Congress empowered the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to enforce all ICA provisions through 
Section 42, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41, while creating an 
exclusive private right of action in Section 36(b).  In 
Sandoval, the Court observed that ―[t]he express provision of 
one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that 
Congress intended to preclude others. . . .‖  532 U.S. at 290 
(citations omitted).   
 
 Unlike Section 36(b) of the ICA, the IAA construed in 
Transamerica did not expressly provide for a private cause of 
action.  See 444 U.S. at 14.  The Transamerica Court 
observed that where the same statute contains private causes 
of action in other sections (such as with the ICA),―it is highly 
improbable that ‗Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention 
an intended private action.‘‖ 444 U.S. at 20 (quoting Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, 
J., dissenting)).  As the Court explained, ―it is an elemental 
canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly 
18 
 
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be 
chary of reading others into it.‖  Id. at 19.  Thus, one reason 
why a right of action exists in Section 215 of the IAA but not 
Section 47(b) of the ICA is because ―Congress intended the 
express right of action set forth in Section 36(b) [of the ICA] 
to be exclusive; there was no similar exclusive, express right 
of action in [the IAA].‖ Tarlov, 559 F. Supp. at 438.    
 
Another reason not to imply the existence of a cause of 
action under Section 47(b) to enforce the standards of Section 
26(f) of the ICA is that Section 26(f) itself does not create 
investor rights.  Section 26(f) states that ―[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any registered separate account funding variable 
insurance contracts, or for the sponsoring insurance company 
of such account, to sell any such contract . . . unless the fees 
and charges deducted under the contract, in the aggregate, are 
reasonable.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(f)(2).  As recognized in 
Olmsted v. Pruco Life Insurance Co. of New Jersey, 283 F.3d 
429 (2d Cir. 2002), this is not ―rights-creating language.‖  Id. 
at 432.  The focus of the section is on the insurance company, 
not on the investors.  This focus on the insurance companies 
rather than the investors is precisely what the Supreme Court 
meant in Sandoval when it observed that ―[s]tatutes that focus 
on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected 
create ‗no implication of an intent to confer rights on a 
particular class of persons.‘‖  532 U.S. at 289 (quoting 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).  This 
led the Second Circuit to conclude in Olmsted that ―[n]o 
provision of the ICA explicitly provides for a private right of 
action for violations of . . . § 26(f) . . . and so we must 




 Furthermore, it is not clear that even the Transamerica 
Court would have found a private right of action in Section 
47(b) due to the differences in text and structure between the 
ICA and the IAA.  While Section 47(b) of the ICA does track 
Section 215 of the IAA closely, there are important 
differences between the two.  While the latter states that 
―[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this 
subchapter . . . shall be void,‖ 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) 
(emphasis added), the former stipulates that ―[a] contract that 
is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this 
subchapter . . . is unenforceable.‖  15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) 
(emphasis added).  This difference, while seemingly slight, is 
significant.  The Court specifically noted in Transamerica 
that ―the legal consequences of voidness are typically not . . . 
limited [to defensive use].  A person with the power to void a 
contract ordinarily may resort to a court to have the contract 
rescinded and to obtain restitution of consideration paid.‖  
444 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted).  The use of the term ―void‖ 
in § 215 prompted the Court to conclude that ―Congress . . . 
intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would 
follow, including the availability of a suit for rescission or for 
an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and 
for restitution.‖  Id. at 19.   
 
 The use of the term ―unenforceable‖ in Section 47(b), 
by way of contrast, carries no such legal implications.  
Indeed, courts have held that the language of Section 47(b) 
creates ―a remedy rather than a distinct cause of action or 
basis of liability.‖  Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358, 
378 (D. Mass 2005); see also Mutchka v. Harris, 373 F. 




In summary, neither the language nor the structure of 
the ICA supports Participants‘ effort to insinuate their 
excessive fees claim into Section 47(b).  Such a claim is 
cognizable under Section 36(b), but Participants lack standing 
to sue under that provision.  They cannot circumvent their 
standing deficiency by resort to Section 47(b).  Accordingly, 




 We now turn to whether pre-suit demand and 
mandatory joinder of trustees is required for Participants‘ 
claims brought under Sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(3) of ERISA.  
The relevant sections state:    
 
A civil action may be brought— . 
. . 
 
(2) by the Secretary, or by a 
participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary for appropriate relief 
under section 1109 of this title;  
 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, 
or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act 
or practice which violates any 
provision of this subchapter or the 
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief 
(i) to redress such violations or 
(ii) to enforce any provisions of 





29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), (a)(3).   
 
 The text is silent as to pre-suit demand and mandatory 
joinder of trustees – in fact, no preconditions on a participant 
or beneficiary‘s right to bring a civil action to remedy a 
fiduciary breach are mentioned at all.  This led the Supreme 
Court to hold in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon 
Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000), that Section 
502(a)(3): 
 
[A]dmits of no limit (aside from 
the ―appropriate equitable relief‖ 
caveat) on the universe of 
possible defendants.  Indeed § 
502(a)(3) makes no mention at all 
of which parties may be proper 
defendants – the focus, instead, is 
on redressing the ―act or practice 
which violates any provision of 
[ERISA Title I].‖ Other 
provisions of ERISA, by contrast, 
expressly address who may be a 
defendant.  
 
Id. at 239 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§1109(a)).  The text of Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) thus 
does not require joinder of trustees.  Furthermore, no Court of 
Appeals has found pre-suit demand a requirement for civil 
actions brought under Sections 502(a)(2) or (a)(3).  See, e.g., 
Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("[A]lthough common law may have required a prior demand 
before bringing an action, Congress did not incorporate that 
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doctrine into the ERISA statute.  The ERISA jurisdictional 
statute, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), contains no such condition 
precedent to filing suit."); Licensed Div. Dist. No. 1 
MEBA/NUM v. Defries, 943 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(citing Katsaros for the proposition that no prior demand 
requirement is incorporated into ERISA). 
 
 The District Court, relying on Diduck v. Kaszycki & 
Sons Contractors, Inc., 874 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1989), and the 
common law of trusts, held that pre-suit demand upon the 
trustees and joinder of the trustees as parties were 
prerequisites to Participants‘ ERISA claims.  Diduck, 
however, was decided under Section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), not Sections 502(a)(2) and (a)(3), under 
which Participants proceed.  Indeed, the Second Circuit itself 
has explained that its holding in Diduck is limited to claims 
brought under Section 502(g)(2), which ―authorizes 
fiduciaries, but no one else, to obtain unpaid contributions 
pursuant to ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, which requires 
employers participating in multi-employer ERISA plans to 
make obligatory contributions to the plans.‖  Coan v. 
Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 258 (2d Cir. 2006).  As the Second 
Circuit explained: 
 
Because section 502(g)(2) only 
applies to suits by fiduciaries, it is 
sensible to require plan 
participants, if they may assert the 
fiduciaries' right of action at all, to 
follow Rule 23.1, which applies 
when the appropriate plaintiff has 
―failed to enforce a right which 
may properly be asserted by it.‖ 
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.  Section 
502(a)(2), unlike section 
502(g)(2), provides an express 
right of action for participants – 
presumably because the drafters 
of ERISA did not think fiduciaries 
could be relied upon to sue 
themselves for breach of fiduciary 
duty.   
 
Id.   
 
 One reason for this lack of a demand requirement for 
Section 502(a)(2) and (a)(3) claims is that the protective 
purposes of ERISA would be subverted if the section 
covering fiduciary breach required beneficiaries to ask 
trustees to sue themselves.  Accordingly, the District Court 
erred in concluding that Section 502(g) claims are ―akin‖ to 
Section 502(a) claims.  Santomenno, 2011 WL 2038769, at 
*3.  ―Because plan participants are expressly authorized to 
bring suit under section 502(a)(2), the situation here is not 
controlled by Diduck.‖  Coan, 457 F.3d at 258. 
 
 In addition to the text, structure, and purpose of 
ERISA, the legislative history of the statute also indicates that 
Congress did not intend to impose obstacles such as pre-suit 
demand or mandatory joinder of trustees with respect to 
claims brought under Section 502(a): 
 
The enforcement provisions have 
been designed specifically to 
provide both the Secretary [of 
Labor] and participants and 
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beneficiaries with broad remedies 
for redressing or preventing 
violations of the [Act] . . . .  The 
intent of the Committee is to 
provide the full range of legal and 
equitable remedies available in 
both state and federal courts and 
to remove jurisdictional and 
procedural obstacles which in the 
past appear to have hampered 
effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities under state law or 
recovery of benefits due to 
participants.   
 
S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.  As we noted in Leuthner v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Northeastern Pennsylvania, 454 F.3d 
120 (3d Cir. 2006), ―ERISA's legislative history indicates that 
Congress intended the federal courts to construe the statutory 
standing requirements broadly in order to facilitate 
enforcement of its remedial provisions.‖  Id. at 128.     
 
 In dismissing the ERISA counts, the District Court 
relied on ―guidance from the common law of trusts.‖  
Santomenno, 2011 WL 2038769 at *3.  We believe this 
reliance was misplaced, as the statute unambiguously allows 
for beneficiaries or participants to bring suits against 
fiduciaries without pre-suit demand or joinder of trustees.  
The common law of trusts is not incorporated en masse into 
ERISA.  On the contrary, ―trust law will offer only a starting 
point, after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to 
what extent, the language of the statute, its structure, or its 
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purposes require departing from common-law trust 
requirements.‖  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 
(1996).  As noted above, the language of the statute, the 
legislative history, and the structure of this remedial 
legislation compel the conclusion that neither a pre-suit 
demand requirement nor joinder of the plan trustees is a 
prerequisite to Participants‘ claims.  Accordingly, the District 
Court should not have dismissed Counts I through VII due to 
the lack of a pre-suit demand upon the plan trustees and the 




 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court‘s judgment on the ICA counts, but vacate the District 
Court‘s dismissal of the ERISA claims and remand for further 
proceedings.  
